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Shibley Telhami *

Is a Standing United Nations Army
Possible? Or Desirable?
The current state of U.N. military operations, especially in the area of
peace enforcement, is not sustainable. A large disparity exists between
international expectations and existing U.N. capabilities which, if not
addressed, could undermine the effectiveness of the United Nations and
weaken international norms. The question is how to address this disparity.
I shall argue that the formation of an effective standing U.N. army is
neither possible nor desirable in the foreseeable future. Instead, it is both
preferable and possible to seek incremental steps that could narrow the
gap between expectations and capabilities and ultimately enhance the
power of the United Nations.
If a fundamental transformation of the United Nations became possible following the collapse of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry (and it is not clear that
it ever was possible), the most opportune moment for change-the
months immediately following the Persian Gulf War of 1991-may have
passed. The births of both the League of Nations and the United Nations
immediately followed major wars that altered international politics
because the dominant world powers were able to exploit unique moments
of opportunity. Although the expedient interests of these powers were the
driving force behind change, the result was, nonetheless, the creation of
long-lasting and consequential multilateral institutions. The end of the
1991 Gulf War may have temporarily provided another opportunity for
transformation, largely because the United States was widely believed to
vield extraordinary power in international affairs (perhaps even more so
than it actually did). This perception was based on U.S. performance in
the Gulf War and the appearance that the United States had won the Cold
War against the Soviet Union. At that moment, when prevailing global
alliances were disrupted, the United States could have acted to preempt a
rethinking of global interests by other nations. The United States might
have had some success in mobilizing the international community to
change U.N. institutions (although I am not here taking a position as to
* Visiting Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings
Institution; Associate Professor of Government and Director of the Near Eastern
Studies Program at Cornell University; PhD. (Political Science), U.C. Berkeley. For
more elaboration on the arguments in this article, and for detailed empirical case
studies supporting them, see INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ETHNIC CONFUcr
(Milton Esman & Shibley Telhami eds., 1995). In addition, for a selected bibliography
on this subject, see Appendix A. I wish to thank David Karol andJennifer Mitchell for
their assistance.
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whether such a move would have been desirable for the United States).
Now, however, that moment may have passed. As new patterns and new
rivalries have emerged in international relations, it has become clear that
perceptions of U.S. power far exceeded reality.
Nonetheless, much reform can still be accomplished, and there are
good reasons for the United States to seek these reforms. Although the
U.S. Congress is in no mood to be kind to the United Nations, strictly
selfish calculations on the part of the United States and other permanent
members of the Security Council suggest several benefits from enhancing
U.N. capabilities. All major powers have problematic interests in world
affairs which they do not consider "vital," and for which they are not willing to commit substantial unilateral resources. Multilateral efforts may be
the best way to address these interests.
However, international organizations have not been sufficiently bolstered to fill the existing need, and opportunities for enhancing U.N.
capabilities remain. Certainly, the scope of intervention by international
organizations, especially U.N. intervention, has increased substantially
since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, U.N. interventions have
taken place almost as frequently as they did during the span of decades
which marked the Cold War. The costs of the U.N. peacekeeping operations in Cambodia in 1992-93 ($1.3 billion) surpassed the combined costs
of all U.N. peacekeeping operations in the previous forty-six years.1 Yet,
these impressive numbers evidence only the increased frequency and size
of U.N. activities rather than demonstrate fundamental change. Thus,
while opportunities for important enhancements of U.N. capabilities
remain, they should not be exaggerated; serious barriers to anything but
limited incremental steps exist.
Two separate barriers prevent fundamental change such as creating
an effective standing U.N. army. The first barrier pertains to U.N. structural changes that would be necessary to effectively accommodate such an
army. The second relates to the changing targets of international intervention and the shifting functions of U.N. intervention.
I.

Structural Barriers to a Standing U.N. Army

Despite some progressive incremental change in international norms of
intervention, 2 a fundamental problem remains in that the United Nations
is still an organization which represents states whose interests are often not
harmonious, and whose power, even within the United Nations, is unequal. Structurally, the value of membership in the U.N. Security Council
(UNSC) increased substantially after the end of the Cold War. Ultimately,
it is the UNSC that interprets the U.N. Charter, establishes new international norms through resolutions, and selects the situations in which it will
1. Jack Donnelly, The Past, the Present, and the Future Prospects, in INTERNATIONAL
ORGAIZATIONS AND ETHNIC CON'LIcr 48 (Milton Esman & Shibley Telhami eds., 1995).
2. Lori F. Damrosch, Changing Conceptions of Intermention, in EMERGING NORMS OF
JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION

91 (Laura W. Reed & Carl Kayson eds., 1993).
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intervene. Within the UNSC, the relevance of the five permanent members has also increased. Although the United States theoretically wields
no more power than the other permanent members, in practice it exercises substantially more influence through issue-linkages that exploit its
trade advantages (e.g., with China), foreign aid (e.g., to Russia), and its
role in European politics.
Thus far, this arrangement has resulted in a reasonable consensus
within the United Nations, even when great reservations emerged about
UNSC resolutions. For example, in the 1994 decision authorizing the use
of force in Haiti, China chose to abstain rather than veto the resolution.
For China, Haiti is a marginal issue, and although it is concerned about
setting a precedent for intervention in the domestic affairs of other states,
China, like all other permanent members, can ultimately veto any such
resolution that applies to itself or to its allies. In short, the consensus is
being maintained by avoiding issues which are of great importance to the
permanent members of the UNSC and may lead to a conflict of interest.
It is doubtful whether such an approach can be maintained for long. Even
if it is maintained, this arrangement may generate resentment among
other states. As recently as May 1995, the United States exercised its first
veto in the post-Cold War era against a unanimous vote by the other fourteen members of the UNSC. In addition, a number of U.N. Member
States believe that the UNSC, whose structure was created a half century
ago, no longer reflects the new configuration of states. 3 Two of the
wealthiest and most influential states, Germany andJapan, lack permanent
seats, and a large number of new and old U.N. members feel that they are
not adequately represented in the UNSC.
One can imagine how this structure could be improved in a way that
would increase representation without undermining consensus. For
example, "permanent" membership could be increased from five to ten
members so as to include Japan, Germany, and three "rotating" members
from the developing states. To increase the chance of consensus, a veto of
any resolution would require at least two permanent members voting
against it. This approach, like many others, can be implemented only if
the UNSC, with its current structure, votes in favor of it, and it is unlikely
given the selfish sovereign interests of the permanent members which
weigh against such an idea. If Russia or China have been willing to cooperate with the United States on some issues with which they disagree, this
agreement arises with the confidence that, on issues of vital interest to
them, they alone can prevent U.N. action through their veto power. Why
should they surrender this power? In short, it is unlikely that any permanent member of the UNSC will be willing to yield on this issue.
A more likely outcome is an increase in the "permanent" membership
of the UNSC whereby the new members do not receive veto power. Germany and Japan have enough direct and indirect influence to secure per3. Barry Blechman, The Military Dimensions of Collective Security, in U.S. PoLIcY AND
(Roger A. Coate ed., 1994).
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manent seats without veto power; like the United States, they can use
economic power for issue-linkage, and they can promise substantial
increases in badly needed contributions to the United Nations. In revising
the UNSC structure to include Germany and Japan, the Member States
would necessarily include representatives from the developing world. Ultimately, however, such restructuring will not fundamentally alter the dominance of sovereign interests in shaping U.N. actions.
There are other important barriers to the establishment of an effective U.N. army in the foreseeable future: the absence of autonomous
sources of income for the United Nations, which must often rely on ad
hoc contributions that are difficult to collect;4 what some have termed "a
feudal bureaucracy;" 5 the absence of intelligence and other information
gathering capabilities; and the weakness of existing logistical capabilities.
Proposals abound for correcting U.N. shortcomings. Realistically,
however, one must consider only those options that do not so threaten the
sovereignty norm that their implementation becomes impossible. Besides
bureaucratic reform and incremental improvement in existing logistical
and military capabilities, two proposals are noteworthy in this regard. One
pertains to the attainment of autonomous revenue sources. U.N.
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations could be partially funded by
sources such as royalties on minerals extracted from deep seabeds or small
charges on international communications and commerce. However, sovereignty could interfere with the implementation of this proposal. For
example, it is likely that governments will be more responsive to domestic
interest groups lobbying against such fees than to international agencies
that do not directly elect these governments. Moreover, the difficulty in
creating a mechanism to enforce collection could prove to be a serious
obstacle to implementation.
The second proposal is to designate a portion of the national military
forces of each state, appropriately trained, for use by the United Nations
in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations authorized by the UNSC.
As recent cases of U.N. action indicate, the current method of mobilizing
multinational forces is highly problematic in that critical time is usually
lost, and the troops ultimately deployed are often ill-trained for the mission. Although this proposal too will likely encounter opposition, the fact
that individual states will have the ultimate say on the deployment of their
6
own troops in any given case improves its chance for approval.
U. Beyond Capabilities: Barriers to U.N. Military Intervention
Limited resources certainly remain a serious barrier to the establishment
of a standing U.N. army. Even the typical conservative scenario for a U.N.
4. Donald Puchala, Outsiders,Insiders, and UNReform, WASH. Q., Autumn 1994, at

161.

5. Raymond Hopkins, Anomie, System Reform, and Challenges to the UN System, in
72 (Milton Esman & Shibley

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ETHNIc CoNFIar

Telhami eds., 1995).
6. Blechman, supra note 3, at 67.
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force of no more than 10,000 troops7 could require as many as 30,000
support staff.8 However, even if the United Nations had all of the
resources of a major superpower, it would still have serious difficulties
intervening effectively for purposes of peace enforcement, especially in
cases of ethnic conflict and civil strife.
Beyond resources, the difficulties facing effective U.N. military intervention emanate from the nature of the U.N. objectives themselves, and
from the changing targets of U.N. intervention. It is useful to examine
three relevant criteria in assessing these difficulties: the nature of intervention; the spatial effectiveness of intervention, i.e., the extent to which it succeeds not only in the specific case of intervention but also in affecting,
through reputation and deterrence, other potential areas of trouble; and
the longitudinal effectiveness of intervention, i.e., the extent to which the success provides a long-term solution to the problem faced.
A. The Nature of Intervention
Although discussions of U.N. intervention tend to focus on difficult and
costly peace enforcement efforts which involve military force, there are
many different types of intervention available to the United Nations, ranging from humanitarian relief to peace enforcement. When the United
Nations and other international organizations (1Os) have engaged in
peacekeeping, economic sanctions, humanitarian relief, and good offices,
IOs have been relatively more effective than in cases of peace-enforcement
and peacemaking. There are a number of reasons for the ineffectiveness
of 10 interventions in the latter cases.
B.

Spatial Effectiveness of Intervention

It is useful to contrast modem U.N. interventions with the interventions by
the superpowers during the Cold War. It is generally assumed that one of
the major reasons for U.N. ineffectiveness is its limited military, economic,
and logistical capabilities, in comparison with, for example, those of the
United States. However, besides the limits imposed by the sovereignty
norm, there is a fundamental structural problem that would make it difficult for the United Nations to intervene effectively even if all the resources
of the United States were at its disposal: the United Nations is unable to
project deterrence.
Even a dominant power like the United States lacks the ability to
intervene in every trouble spot around the globe. When the United States
intervened during the Cold War, it did so only selectively in places such as
Korea and Vietnam where the local interests of the United States realistically did not warrant the costs of intervention. The idea was that effective
actions in these cases would deter aggression against vital American inter7. Capt. Gregory P. Harper, Creatinga U.N. PeaceEnforcement Force: A Casefor U.S.

Leadership,FLETCHER F. WoRLD Arr., Winter/Spring 1994, at 49; Puchala, supra note 4,
at 161.
8. Dick Kirschten, Missions Impossible, 25 NAT'LJ. 2576 (1993).
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ests elsewhere, thus justifying the costs of intervention. When deterrence
worked (and there are many who argue that it did not), it was for two
primary reasons: areas of "vital" American interests were clearly defined
and limited, as were the targets of deterrence, namely the Soviet Union
and its allies. However, the United States lacked the resources to intervene in all areas of vital interest; the logic of deterrence required effective
intervention only when necessary, thereby making it too risky for the
targets of deterrence to challenge interests elsewhere. Where intervention
failed, such as in the 1982-83 U.S. intervention in Lebanon, the Reagan
Administration learned that forces should be committed to military action
overseas only when "vital" interests are at stake, and that such commitment
should be made only with the clear intent and support needed to win.9
The potential for deterrence through U.N. intervention is much
more limited. First, if the logical prerequisite of deterrence is the potential aggressor's fear of punishment, it is hard to know whom to punish in
most cases of ethnic conflict, where the source of the conflict is either a
collapse of central authority or a number of small internal aggressors. Second, since, in principle, the measure of relevance in any given case of
conflict is not the vital interest of any single Member State but U.N.
norms, all violations of these norms present potential cases of intervention. From this perspective, one cannot differentiate between civil strife in
Sudan and civil strife in Northern Iraq. The result is a large set of potential targets of U.N. intervention, many of which require simultaneous
responses, thus presenting the United Nations with an impossible task
even with substantially enhanced resources. At the same time, failure to
intervene in only a few of these cases undermines the very norm that the
United Nations strives to establish.
When one adds the issue of sovereignty to this deterrence problem,
additional complications emerge. The UNSC resolution authorizing intervention in Somalia, for example, included the finding of a "threat to international peace and security" at the insistence of China and some third
world countries who were worried that intervention in Somalia might set a
precedent for intervention in their own domestic politics. Similarly, when
the United States attempted to mobilize the UNSC to authorize military
intervention in Haiti in 1994, China and the Latin American states
expressed concerns that action in Haiti might establish a threatening precedent. Consequently, the U.S. Ambassador explained to the United
Nations that this case was "unique." In contrast, most third world countries supported U.N. action against Iraq following the latter's invasion of
Kuwait, even though most perceived it as action precipitated by U.S.
national interests. Furthermore, just as the Cold War was ending, it was
unlikely that weaker states would acquiesce in permitting a strong state,
Iraq, to invade its weak neighbor, Kuwait-particularly where the aggression was against the wishes of the United States, the most powerful nation
9.

RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERMCAN

Lwz (1990).
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in the world. In short, sovereignty and calculations of state interest complicate the effectiveness of the United Nations.
Since enhanced resources alone cannot overcome the above structural barriers to effectiveness, there will be a growing need to set realistic
priorities in the same way that effective states do. For example, serious
violations of human rights, such as genocide, should be accorded substantial resources, in the same way that states accord resources to the defense
of "vital" interests. Only by setting such priorities, even if limited in scope,
can the United Nations become incrementally more effective; otherwise,
the increasing disparity between the international expectations of the
United Nations and its ability to meet those expectations will soon diminish the organization's influence.
C.

Longitudinal Effectiveness of Intervention

Intervention by international organizations is more likely to be effective in
the short-term than to provide a long-term solution to a conflict. For
example, although international efforts have provided humanitarian relief
to the Kurds in northern Iraq, they have not solved their plight; while
addressing the immediate problem of famine in Somalia, international
intervention was unable to resolve the civil conflict that produced that
famine. U.N. peacekeeping forces in Cyprus have succeeded in minimizing the violence between the conflicting groups but only through a longterm commitment of resources and without evidence that the conflict has
come closer to resolution-perhaps even reducing the local parties' incentives to reach a lasting settlement. Part of the difficulty is that ethnic conflicts remain largely a national problem whose resolution depends upon
subnational actors. The Kurds of Iraq will have to face the consequences
of their conflict with the Iraqi state long after the international determination to provide them with help has diminished. Effective intervention by
international organizations can take place only after achieving a fuller
understanding of the internal dynamics of conflict.
Given the substantial resource constraints facing the United Nations
as well as the escalating costs of intervention following the outbreak of
hostilities in ethnic conflicts, international organizations should invest
more resources in establishing effective mechanisms for early diplomatic
intervention. Early warning systems could be set up, and small observer
units could be dispatched to potential trouble spots in order to enable the
United Nations to act in a preventive capacity, and to initiate good offices
and mediation procedures while there is still time to preempt the outbreak of violence. Predicting imminent crises is very difficult, however,
and while such measures are helpful, their limitations should be noted.
I.

Changing Means and Venues for International Intervention

In the absence of a standing U.N. army, how might international interventions in local conflicts be more effective? Because the U.N. is likely to
continue to rely on national resources in major instances of intervention,
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any assessment of the prospects of U.N. intervention must take into
account calculations of national interest. States are not likely to commit
substantial resources to resolve an international conflict, especially in the
military arena, if important national interests are not at stake. In contrast,
local parties to an ethnic conflict are generally willing to commit most of
their resources to the conflict, because of its immediate importance.
Thus, if an international intervention is to have any chance of success at
all, it usually requires substantial external resources. The fact that only
external actors with important interests are willing to pay the costs of intervention presents a serious dilemma for the United Nations.
The source of the dilemma is that "neutrality" is a critical asset when
international organizations intervene in local conflict; the chance of failure increases when local actors perceive the interveners as being biased.
As Hopkins illustrates, the potential effectiveness of the United Nations
depends upon its universality.' 0 Regional organizations, such as the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the Arab League, are less effective because they are unable to remain neutral.
Yet, it is partial parties, whose interests are at stake in the conflict, that
have the will and incentive to commit the resources required for intervention. Therefore, it is not a surprise that Syria and the Arab League took
the lead in intervening in Lebanese strife, or that the United States mobilized large resources for oil-rich Kuwait. When intervention occurs in areas
of no vital interest to the national interveners, as when the United States
aided Somalia, commitment cannot be sustained. Those who expressed
faith in the power of television depicting human suffering found that television is a double-edged sword: the blood of a single compatriot is far
more powerful than a humanitarian cause. Moreover, with so much suffering around us, public sensitivity is easily dulled. It is likely that far more
people followed the OJ. Simpson murder case in 1994 than paid attention
to the horrifying tragedy in Rwanda.
One result of the end of the Cold War has been a substantial decline
in incentives for the superpowers to intervene in ethnic conflict, at the
same time that the opportunities for intervention have increased. The
end of the Cold War both contributed to the outbreak of hostilities in
Yugoslavia and reduced the incentives of the powerful states to intervene
in that conflict. Because of Yugoslavia's strategic location near the heart
of Europe, the United States, European states, and the U.S.S.R. would
have been much more concerned about the consequences of the conflict
during the Cold War. In short, despite increased public awareness of ethnic conflict globally, a diminishing number of states regard these conflicts
as a high priority.
In most instances, states bordering on areas of ethnic conflict are the
most affected by it:OAS states are more alarmed than others by events in
Haiti; Europeans are more alarmed by events in Yugoslavia; and OAU
states are more concerned about the tragedy in Rwanda. Consequently,
10. Hopkins, supra note 5, at 72.
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the United Nations increasingly empowers regional organizations (e.g.,
OAU in the case of Rwanda) and other multilateral groups (e.g., NATO in
Bosnia; "a multilateral force under unified command and control" in
Haiti) to intervene in problem areas. This trend is likely to continue.
Although such a trend means that interveners inevitably will be less
"neutral" than some hope, it is nonetheless unavoidable given the
resource constraints that the United Nations will likely continue to face.
There are, however, ways to reduce the impact of the partiality of regional
interveners. First, it is important to avoid unilateral interventions-the
broader the regional organization, the better. Second, the United Nations
should consolidate formal working relationships with regional organizations, as suggested by the Secretary- General. Third, regional organizations must be encouraged to upgrade their own structures to deal with the
new tasks. Fourth, even when regional organizations intervene, such interventions should take place within the context of an authorizing resolution
of the UNSC which spells out specific mandates.
Nevertheless, the role of the more powerful states, especially the
United States, will remain indispensable in carrying out some operations
in a timely fashion. Even in purely humanitarian cases, as providing relief
to Rwandan refugees indicated, the logistical support for efficient and
timely implementation requires the type of capability that few states other
than the United States can provide.

Conclusion
Given the assumption that only minor changes in the U.N. Security Council will take place in the foreseeable future and that only incremental
improvements in the availability of U.N. resources will occur, I conclude
that a standing U.N. army is neither possible nor desirable. As an alternative, the following modest steps could enhance U.N. effectiveness:
1. States should earmark some of their national forces for U.N. operations, while retaining veto power over the involvement of their own
troops in any given operation.
2. The power of regional organizations must be enhanced, and their
relations with the United Nations must be strengthened. Although
regional organizations are less neutral than the United Nations might be,
this option is an improvement over the current state of affairs.
3. Given serious resource limitations, the United Nations must establish priorities by focusing on feasible tasks; only then will the United
Nations gain the confidence of the international community.
Although these steps will not fundamentally transform the United
Nations, they are both possible and necessary for building a better, more
effective United Nations.
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